Long-term unemployment in the varieties of capitalism by Chilosi, Alberto
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Long-term unemployment in the varieties
of capitalism
Alberto Chilosi
University of Pisa
5. March 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58553/
MPRA Paper No. 58553, posted 14. September 2014 01:49 UTC
  
LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE VARIETIES OF 
CAPITALISM  
 
 
Alberto Chilosi 
University of Pisa 
Via S. Andrea 48 56127 Pisa (Italy) 
chilosi@sp.unipi.it 
 
 
Key words:  Varieties of Capitalism, Long-term unemployment, Employment protection, 
Economic fallacies 
 
ABSTRACT 
Usually, when the attention is focused on the different performances of the labour market, the overall 
rate of unemployment is at the center stage. But this is misleading: while short term unemployment 
can be seen as physiological for the the working of the labour market, long-term unemployment is 
certainly pathological. The paper considers how the different varieties of capitalism affect the rate of 
long-term unemployment, rather than the aggregate rate. The liberal market variety, where 
employment protection is the lowest, presents lower rates of long-term unemployment than the 
continental European and the Mediterranean varieties. In the latter both employment protection and 
long-term unemployment are the highest and labour market participation the lowest. The social-
democratic Scandinavian variety gets the best of both worlds: low rates of long-term unemployment, 
high rates of labour participation, lower degree of inequality, with relatively high levels of 
employment protection. However the Scandinavian model may be hardly applicable in countries, such 
as the Mediterranean ones, where a sizable part of public opinion apparently adheres to the various 
specifications of the “lump of something” economic fallacy. Low rates of long-term unemployment 
and high levels of labour participation are also produced by the far-Eastern Asian variety, but at the 
cost of a markedly dualistic labour market structure. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The main object of the paper is to consider how employment protection leads to different 
long-term rates of unemployment in the different varieties of capitalism. In the varieties of 
capitalism literature at the centre stage of labour market performance is the aggregate rate of 
unemployment.
1
 But this is misleading: the real social and economic issue is not 
unemployment as such but long-term unemployment. Indeed, short-term unemployment can 
be seen as physiological to the functioning of the labour market, while long-term 
unemployment is uncontroversially pathological. This paper innovates, alongside a previous 
one centred on issues of corporate governance (Chilosi, 2012), by putting long-term 
unemployment instead of aggregate unemployment as such at the centre stage of the 
comparison between the labour market performance of different varieties of capitalism.  
 
2. EMPLOYEE PROTECTION AND REPRESENTATION, AND THE VARIETIES 
OF CAPITALISM 
 
A priori we may think the different ways in which workers’ interests are protected to be 
substitute to each other: for instance mandatory representation in corporate boards or in work 
councils vs. collective trade unions rights or  individual employee rights. In reality rather than 
substitution complementarity applies, different economic and institutional traditions and 
different social and political values achieving different overall levels of employee protection.
2
 
 
Labour market institutions, together with complementary ones relating to social policy and 
the economic role of the state, or the working of financial and commodity markets, allow to 
distinguish different varieties of capitalism. Following Hall and Soskice (2001), and Amable 
(2003) we may distinguish the following varieties of developed capitalist economies: 
1. Liberal market  
2. Continental European 
3. Mediterranean European 
4. Social-democratic Scandinavian 
5. East Asian.
3
 
 
2. LONG TERM UNEMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR MARKET PERFORMANCE IN 
THE VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 
 
In the tables that follow we show labour market outcomes, and in particular rates of long-term 
unemployment, for the above varieties, as well as the degree of employment protection, as 
indicated by OECD’s aggregate employment protection index
4
 (averages for the years 1991-
2007):  
 
                                                 
1
  Cf. Calmors and Driffil (1988), Hall and Soskice (2001, p. 20); Amable (2003). Some consideration of the 
issue can be found in Becker (2009), p. 157. 
2
  Cf. Chilosi (2012). Hall and Soskice, following Aoki (1994), rather than pointing to the different ideological 
and cultural backgrounds, consider the issue in terms of efficiency, as complementarity between institutions 
applies when the “presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns (or efficiency of the other)”. 
3
  Hall and Soskice concentrate their analysis on the dichotomy between liberal market and coordinated market 
economies, but also a separate Mediterranean variety is mentioned by them (p. 21).  
4
  "Unweighted average of version 1 sub-indicators for regular contracts (EPR_v1) and temporary contracts 
(EPT_v1)", where EPR_v1 is "sub-indicator for dismissal of employees on regular contracts" and EPT_v1 is 
"sub-indicator for strictness of regulation on temporary contracts". “Summary indicators are on a scale from 0 
(least restrictions) to 6 (most restrictions)” (OECD 2010). 
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Table 1. Long -term unemployment, employment protection, and the varieties of capitalism: the Liberal Market, 
Central European and Mediterranean European varieties
a)
. 
 
 
 
Long-term 
unemployment 
rate 
Unemployment 
rate 
Participation 
rate 
Youth long-
term 
unemployment 
rate 
Employment 
protection 
index 
USA 0.5 5.4 66.1 0.6 0.21 
UK 2.2 6.7 61.4 2.7 0.66 
Canada 1.0 8.4 65.6 0.7 0.75 
Australia  2.0 7.4 63.5 2.6 1.05 
Ireland 4.5 8.4 57.4 5.5 0.98 
New 
Zealand 
1.3 6.5 65.2 1.6 1.15 
Average 1.9 7.1 63.2 2.3 0.80 
      
Germany  4.2 8.6 58.5 2.5 2.54 
 France    3.8 10.3 55.3 5 3.01 
 Belgium  4.5 8.2 51.1 6.6 2.52 
Netherlands  2.2 4.8 61.4 0.6 2.4 
 Austria  1.2 4.1 58.3 1.1 2.13 
Average 3.2 7.2 56.9 3.2 2.52- 
      
Italy 5.8 9.8 48.1 15.8 2.69 
Spain 7.3 15.5 52.4 10.9 3.31 
Greece 5.1 9.6 52.1 13.3 3.27- 
Portugal 2.5 5.9 60.7 10.9 3.67 
Average 5.2 10.2 53.3 12.7 3.24 
 
  Country averages for the years 1991-2007. Source: ILO (2011);. last column: OECD (2010).  
 
Table 2. Long -term unemployment, employment protection, and the varieties of capitalism: the Scandinavian, 
and East Asian varieties. 
 
Country Long-term 
unemployment 
rate 
Unemployment 
rate 
Participation 
rate 
 
 
Youth long-
term 
unemployment 
rate 
Employment 
protection 
index 
Denmark 1.5 6 66.1 0.8 1.71 
Finland
5
 2.9 10.8 61.7 1.9 2.08 
Sweden 1.7 7.1 64 2.3 2.44 
Norway 0.6 4.3 65.6 0.6 2.69 
Average 1.7 7.1 64.4 1.4 2.23 
      
Japan 1 3.9 62.4 1.3 1.58 
Korea 0.1 3.5 61.2 0.1 2.32 
Taiwan NA 3.1 NA NA NA 
Singapore 0.1 3.7 65.4 NA NA 
Hong 
Kong 
NA 4.3 61.4 NA NA 
Average   3.7 62.6    
a)
Country averages for the years 1991-2007. Source: ILO (2011);. last column: Oecd (2010).  
                                                 
5
  Finland relatively high rates of unemployment may be explained as a consequence of the economic shock of 
losing Soviet trade after 1990. 
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Table 3. The varieties of capitalism: resilience to the crisis. Average rates of long-term unemployment in the 
years 2008-2011  
 
USA 1.9 Germany 3.4 Italy 3.7 Denmark 1.1 Japan 1.6 
UK
6
 2.1 France 3.4 Spain 5.7 Finland 1.5 Korea 0.0 
Canada 0.8 Belgium 3.6 Greece 5.5 Sweden 1.1   
Australia 1.0 Netherlands 1.1 Portugal 5.3 Norway 0.3   
Ireland 5.0 Austria 1.0       
New 
Zealand 
0.4         
Average 1.9 Average 2.5 Average 5.1 Average 1.0 Average 0.8 
Source: ILO (2012) 
 
 
Table 4 Unemployment by duration: average number of months 
 
 Australia Canada USA Europe G7 
1991-2007 2.6 4.8 3.8 14.4 4.0 
2008-2011 1.8 4.2 6.6 14.6 6.4 
Source: OECD; averages of the two periods. NB: the OECD table includes only a few countries or countries 
aggregates. No singular European country is included with complete data for the period. Partial data are 
available only for Finland and Norway. 
 
From the data reported in the tables 1 and 2 above it turns out that, with the notable exception 
of the Scandinavian and Far Eastern varieties, wherever there is greater employment 
protection, long-term unemployment is on average higher, and the participation rate lower. 
On the other hand, as it could be expected, the relation appears to be different inside the 
different varieties in the different countries, as the impact of employment protection depends 
on the specificity of the different institutional contexts and circumstances such as, for 
instance, the extent of compliance and different juridical practices, or the extent and duration 
of unemployment subsidies, and the type of economic polices concretely pursued.
7
  
 
Looking at the individual countries we can see that there are two clear outliers: Ireland and 
Austria. Ireland has a long-term unemployment performance akin to that of the Central 
European and Mediterranean countries, notwithstanding a low level of employment 
protection. It is notable however that following favourable external factors as well as policy 
choices (such as centralized bargaining leading to wage moderation) its performance 
markedly improves since the half of the nineties
8
, leading to very low rates of long-term 
unemployment that are comparable to those of the other liberal market economies towards the 
end at the nineties and during the following decade until the crisis.
9
 Austria, whose 
institutions make it close the social-democratic Scandinavian model, has low level of long-
term unemployment, together with a high level of employment protection. This applies to 
                                                 
6
  Finland relatively high rates of unemployment can be explained as a consequence of the economic shock of 
losing Soviet trade after 1990. 
7
  For a similar remark, on the dependency on other institutional circumstances of the impact of employment 
protection legislation on labour market flows see Boeri, Van Ours, 2008, p. 213. 
8
  Cf. Walsh (2002). 
9
  Amable (2003, p. 173), contrary to Hall and Soskice, puts Ireland in the Central European variety. We have 
followed Hall and Soskice owing to Ireland’s low index of employment protection and the Anglo-Saxon legal 
tradition common with the other economies of the group. 
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lesser extent also to the Netherlands.
10
 We have put France in the central European variety 
following Amable, but it is on the borderline: indeed, according to Hall and Soskice (p. 21) it 
belongs to the Mediterranean variety (“marked by a large agrarian sector and recent histories 
of extensive state intervention”). 
 
If we now turn to the aggregate rate of unemployment, we see that the differences between the 
different varieties are much smaller. For the liberal market, central European and 
Scandinavian varieties the difference is practically nought. The rate is about half in East Asia, 
and about one third higher in the Mediterranean variety. From the above data we may draw 
the conclusion that in the liberal market and Scandinavian varieties the labour market is on 
average markedly more dynamic than in the other ones, as borne by the implied higher rates 
of short-term unemployment (but job to job transfers, another aspect of labour market 
dynamics, are not considered here).
11
 It is in fact to be expected that short run unemployment 
to  be higher in the liberal market economies where layoffs (and thus hirings) are less difficult 
and costly. Moreover leaving a job in order to look for a better one, and to be more choosy in 
accepting a new job when laid off, is less risky than wherever rates of long-term 
unemployment are higher (especially if unemployment subsidies are generous, as is the case 
in the Scandinavian countries).   
 
4. THE SPECIAL SCANDINAVIAN CASE: THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS? 
 
According to the above data the Scandinavian model produces the best of both worlds: high 
levels of labour market performance with low levels of long-term unemployment, as well as 
high levels of employment protection, together with comparatively greater equality (as shown 
in table 5 below).
12
  
                                                 
10
  According to Boyer 1997 classification, quoted in Amable (2003, p. 83), Austria belongs, together with 
the Scandinavian countries, to a common social-democratic model. According to Andersen et al. (2007, p.14) 
not only Austria, but also the Netherlands, another possible outlier, are close to the Scandinavian (or “Nordic”) 
model. 
11
  In countries where there is greater job protection the dynamics of the labour market could take the form 
of greater job to job transfers (Skedinger, 2010, p. 118). To have a dynamic labour market is particularly 
important for innovative and technological advanced production activities, where risks and rewards are 
potentially higher, and the burden of an almost fixed labour force protected from lay-off much more 
troublesome. 
12
  As well as relatively high rates of economic growth (cf. Anderson et al., 2007, p. 15). Acemoglu et al 
(2012) argue that the success of the Scandinavian economies has been made possible by the technological 
progress engineered by the more unequal, competitive and business friendly American system, which pushes 
forward the technological frontier to the advantage of everybody else. In other terms, according to them the 
Scandinavian model enjoys external advantages that would not occur if it were universally adopted. However 
Acemoglu’s contention is not borne out by actual data, as provided by the Global Innovation Index (GII 2012). 
In the Global Innovation Index rankings the United States occupies the tenth position, preceded by Sweden 
(rank 2), Finland (rank 4), and Denmark (rank 7). In the innovation output index sub-ranking the United States 
ranks 16-th and is preceded by the Scandinavian countries. For a commentary of the relative USA position see 
p. 15 of GII 2012 which concludes that “in a series of indicators, the USA has been facing a weaker 
performance. This is particularly evident in specific areas, mostly those linked to education and the tapping of 
global talent, and to research, patenting, and scientific publications.” Moreover there is always the doubt of 
how much the economic outcomes of a particular country are the product of formal institutions rather than of 
the peculiar characteristics of the country itself, as rooted in its history, geography and demography. In 
particular, the alleged high propensity toward risk and enterprise, and the innovative propensity of the 
American economy, could be due, rather than to the absence of a safety net, to a system of values which leads 
to the choice of not having a safety net at all (on the different value systems and the different perception of 
poverty and inequality in the USA and Europe, see Alesina, 2006). The safety net in itself is not adversary to 
taking risks, on the contrary it may reduce the personal riskiness of otherwise risky innovative activities: you 
may take risks more lightly if in case of bad luck the safety net guarantees a minimum living standard instead 
of the prospect of utter destitution. Indeed, a collective safety net provides a sort of collective insurance against 
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Table 5. Levels of inequality (Gini coefficients) and varieties of capitalism 
 
USA 45 Germany  28.3 Italy 36 Denmark 23.2 Japan 38.1 
UK 36  France    26.7 Spain 34.7 Finland 26.9 Korea 35.8 
Canada 32.6  Belgium  33 Greece 35.1 Sweden 25 Taiwan NA 
Australia  35.2 Netherland 30.9 Portugal 38,5 Norway 25.8 Singapore 42.5 
Ireland 34  Austria  31          
Average 36.6 Average 30 Average 36,1 Average 25,2 Average 38,8 
Source: WorldFactbook 2007. The lower the value of the Gini coefficient, the lower is inequality 
 
How does the Scandinavian model produce its labour market remarkable outcomes? As 
explained by a group of authoritative Scandinavian economists (Andersen et al, 2007), the 
labour market institutions entail “high unionization, highly coordinated wage bargaining 
geared to wage compression, active labour market policies, and relatively generous 
unemployment benefits” (p. 40). Social cohesion
13
 and centralized decision making bring 
about wage moderation, the possible consequences of wage increases on aggregate 
employment are to some extent internalized. At the same time active labour market policies 
contribute to achieve low levels of incidence of long-term unemployment.
14
 
  
5. IS THE SCANDINAVIAN MODEL EXPORTABLE? 
 
It seems unlikely that the Scandinavian model could be easily exportable elsewhere. It is 
certainly not exportable wherever the trade union movement is fragmented and subjected to 
the competition of “ultras” trade unions sharing the zero sum view of a class struggle 
ideology, leading to a wage push incompatible with relative price stability and full 
employment, or whenever trade unions are poised to the defence of specific sectoral interests 
rather than paying attention to overall workers’ interests (including those of the unemployed). 
In general “economies at the extremes - with highly centralized or highly decentralized labour 
markets – [have] better employment records than those economies 'betwixt and between'” 
(Freeman, 1988, p. 65)
15
. Moreover, independently of the formal institutions, cooperative 
solutions such as of the Scandinavian type are more difficult to achieve wherever, as it may 
be the case in Mediterranean countries, important sections of public opinion and of the 
political class, as well of the trade union movement, are prone to wishful thinking and share 
the popular economic fallacies expounded in the appendix. The corresponding cultural 
background may be reflected not only in the extent of labour protection granted by the formal 
legal framework, but also in the way in which it finds actual judicial application. Finally 
                                                                                                                                                        
destitution, in case the bets get sour, at much lower costs and lower moral hazard (since there is no problem of 
adverse selection and there is the advantage of increasing returns to scale), and with more complete coverage, 
than private insurance, even if it is true that the taxes needed to finance the collective safety net could have a 
negative impact on incentives. But in theory at least the latter is not a foregone conclusion. Usually the 
substitution effect of taxation is considered in popular discussions, but the income effect should also be taken 
into account, which would work in the opposite direction. Obviously much depends on the specific way the tax 
system is structured, and, in an international context, on the mobility of the relevant production factors. (On the 
ways in which a safety net can favour growth see Alderman and Yemtsov, 2013.) 
13
  “The system is based on social cohesion in the sense of a perception that we are all, in one way or 
another, in the same boat” (ibidem, p. 65). 
14
  For a sober appraisal of the efficacy of active market policies in Sweden see however ibidem, p. 115. 
15
  On this see in particular Calmors and Driffil (1988). 
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“Nordic countries are small and ethnically homogeneous … Ethnic homogeneity is conducive 
to the emergence of trust, the key ingredient in “social capital”, which is widely believed to 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action. In fact, the level of trust is 
higher in the Nordic countries (and the Netherlands) than elsewhere according to available 
indicators” (Andersen et al., 2007, p. 39). But these peculiarities of the Scandinavian (or 
“Nordic”) social model are challenged by the recent processes of massive immigration 
(ibidem). 
 
6. WHAT ABOUT THE SOUTH-EAST ASIAN MODEL? 
 
It is based on a dualistic labour market solution: the core employees enjoy protection of their 
job legally or implicitly while the workers in the secondary market are subjected to a high 
degree of flexibility and much lower pay, functioning as a buffer stock. In particular there is 
high supply elasticity by the female component of the labour force, with a high propensity to 
retire from the labour market in case of downward employment pressure, as related to more 
traditional family values. In Japan “the majority of employees such as female employees, 
part-time workers and workers in smaller firms are not covered” by the long-term 
employment system reserved to men employed in big enterprises (Tachibanaki, 2000, p. 11). 
The coexistence of a core section of protected workers with a relatively large one of lesser 
paid temporary employees can be found also in the case of Korea, where the recorded 
incidence of long-term unemployment is minimal.
16
  
 
7. INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS 
 
Let us return to what seems to be the more feasible alternative outside Scandinavia, a trade-
off between employment protection and long-term unemployment. As it turns out from the 
data above the continental and Mediterranean varieties lead to better protection of insiders 
wishing to maintain their jobs, the Anglo-Saxon liberal market variety of outsiders wishing to 
find a job, as shown by the much lower average long-term unemployment rates in the latter 
variety. Putting ourselves in the perspective of the preferences of a representative worker over 
alternative institutional arrangements, it is by no means clear a priori that even the 
representative unemployed, if given the choice, would prefer a liberal labour market system, 
notwithstanding the lower probability to end up as long-term unemployed in the latter case. 
Indeed, even an unemployed worker may prefer to trade-off the greater difficulty of finding a 
job now with the shield provided by employment protection once a job is found.  
 
Surprisingly enough, empirical inquiries in the satisfaction associated to different contractual 
arrangements in different normative setups do not report better feeling of security in case of 
stronger legal protection of permanent employment contracts. Wherever private employees 
are less protected, paradoxically they feel more secure: the empirical studies surveyed by Per 
Skedinger (2010) “indicate that employees with permanent jobs perceive less security in 
countries with stricter legislation” (p. 118). In Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009, p. 207) 
“workers feel less secure in countries where jobs are more protected” (with the exception of 
“permanent public jobs, suggesting that such jobs are perceived to be by and large insulated 
from labor market fluctuations”).  
 
The positive relationship between labour market protection and long-term unemployment that 
is shown in the tables above can be an obvious explanation of the latter result. In the end 
                                                 
16
  Grubb, Lee and Tergeist (2007), p. 12. 
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greater security in the job does not lead to labour market security, aside from public 
employment, where security in the job is felt to be absolute.
17
  
 
One may also consider that even when there is no legal employment protection de facto 
protection is provided by the interest of the employer to continue to take advantage of the 
services of the employees and to maintain a good working relationship with them. An 
unjustified dismissal, even if not sanctioned by the law, may be sanctioned by reducing the 
trust that the employees have on the employer, and their work proficiency. Whenever there is 
legal protection and the burden of proof in demonstrating that the dismissal was justified lies 
with the employer there is a high probability that the employees who have recourse to a court 
of law against an alleged unfair dismissal have been in reality dismissed  fairly (remember the 
standard distinction between to observe and verify: one thing is to observe something, such as 
untrustwordy or inefficient and incompetent behaviour, another to be able to prove it in a 
court of law). This ultimately may turn against the broad interest of workers as a whole, 
increasing the cost of labour for any given wage level, and  reducing  productivity and 
opportunities of employment. 
 
An additional cost from the viewpoint of workers’ welfare could be the greater probability of  
entrapment: as high rates of long-term unemployment tend to be associated with stronger 
legal protection of permanent employment, to leave a secure, even if unsatisfactory, job in 
order to look for a more satisfactory one could be too risky a decision. This impairs the 
allocative function of the labour market and the way in which workers pursue the search for 
more productive (and better paid), as well as more satisfactory, jobs.
18
 In the end greater 
labour mobility could have positive effects on allocative efficiency, while higher wages could 
compensate for the negative welfare consequences of higher labour mobility (“churning 
rate”).
19
 
 
The above considerations are in agreement with the results of Origo and Pagani (2009). 
According to their inquiry on workers’ job satisfaction, using the micro-data of the 
Eurobarometer Survey, “job stability and perceived security are not the same thing … job 
satisfaction is relatively low mainly when perceived job security is low. In addition, the 
combination ‘temporary but secure job’ (hence, the lack of only job stability) seems 
preferable to the combination ‘permanent but insecure job’ (that is, the lack of only job 
security). This indicates that the length of the contract may be less important if the worker 
perceives that s/he is not at risk of becoming unemployed” (p. 554). 
 
Aside from what appears to be the case in the Scandinavian social-democratic variety, the 
protection of what is considered to be the weaker side in the employment relationship, the 
employee, can be to the cost of even weaker actors, the long-term unemployed, or the 
employed in the secondary labour market, as well as the discouraged workers. At the same 
time the weakness of the employee position, ceteris paribus, is all the greater the lower the 
probability of finding a job in case of layoffs and the lower the unemployment benefits 
(which are not considered in the present paper). Here the legislator faces trade-offs, which are 
                                                 
17
 “‘Job security’, taken literally, applies to security within the present job, while ‘labour market security’ 
is a wider concept which also includes the possibility of finding a new job if an employee has been fired” 
(Skedinger, 2010, p. 113). 
18
  As expounded, in particular, by the hedonic theory of wages. On the negative consequences of 
employment protection on labour mobility and productivity growth see Martin and Scarpetta, 2011. 
19
  Cf. Böckerman et al. (2011). 
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dealt with in the different varieties of capitalism, as well as in the different countries, in 
different ways. 
 
8. THE DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE 
 
Looking at the dynamic perspective, of changing the institutions of labour market, and, in 
particular, employment protection, it is conventional wisdom that the employed are usually a 
much larger proportion of the labour force, and of the electoral constituency, than the 
unemployed, and their voice by way of the trade unions may be louder. Moreover the 
employed, alike anybody else, may have a propensity to look at their perceived individual 
interest rather than to the broad picture. Thus, ceteris paribus, it may be politically easier to 
increase rather than decrease employment protection. At the same time, if increased 
employment protection leads to lower probability to outflow from unemployment, thus 
increasing the loss associated to lay-offs, the perceived interest of the employed in 
employment protection is enhanced and any reduction in protection may become politically 
more difficult. The contrary process could lead, for reciprocal reasons, to the opposite 
outcome; thus labour market reforms could acquire their own momentum.
20
 
 
9. CONCLUSION 
 
In the end the choice between the varieties of capitalism, or the wholesale rejection of them, is 
a matter of individual, and, in the aggregate, social, preferences and social choice. But one 
should not be deluded, as is often the case, by wishful thinking as to the overall consequences 
of employment protection in the different social and institutional environments. And attention 
should always be paid to the true nature of the outside options and of the opportunity costs, 
avoiding what we may call the general Nirvana fallacy: if some social arrangement is not 
perfect it should be rejected because perfection is just around the corner.
21
 Moreover what is 
relevant is not what alternative is theoretically possible, but what is actually possible. 
 
Turning to current European debates, we may see that the countries making up the European 
Union belong to different varieties of capitalism, embedded in different historical, cultural 
and legal traditions. The pretence by some political forces to impose a particular variety at the 
level of the European Union, in particular with respect to the subject matter of the present 
paper, the discipline of the labour market, may put the European Union institutions into 
needless dangerous strains.
22
 This may be an area where the benefits of institutional variety, 
in terms of learning, competing, and adapting to local conditions and traditions, outweigh the 
advantages of institutional uniformity in establishing a formal play level field for European 
businesses.
                                                 
20
  On the political economy of employment protection and related literature see Bertola (1998), Saint-
Paul (2002). 
21
  For the Nirvana fallacy see Demsetz (1969, p. 1): “The view that now pervades much public policy 
economics implicitly presents the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing 'imperfect' 
institutional arrangement. This nirvana approach differs considerably from a comparative institution approach 
in which the relevant choice is between alternative real institutional arrangements.” 
22
  Of course there is the argument of externalities, firms in a country where the labour protection 
legislation is more stringent can find some difficulty in competing with countries where the protection is lower. 
But this applies in general to the whole world, and in case competitiveness were affected by the stiffness of the 
labour market some correction could be found in the wage levels. In practice however the burden of adjustment 
may fall on the unemployed, on secondary workers, and on productivity growth. And there seems to be no 
consensus in Europe as to what extent the interest of insiders should be privileged in relation to outsiders. 
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APPENDIX: THREE POPULAR ECONOMIC FALLACIES 
 
Three popular economic fallacies often mar the public discourse about labour law, economic 
systems, and (un)employment (as well as about any other possible issue of economic policy). 
The first and the third are widely known and are taught in a way or another to students of 
economics at the introductory level.
23
 The lump of labour fallacy is known especially to 
labour economists. Its generalization as the “general lump of something fallacy” is my 
personal contribution. 
 
1. The fallacy of composition 
If something is good for somebody it is good for the whole class of people to which the 
person belongs: if a worker’s job is protected, and this protection is extended to all the jobs, 
this turns to the advantage of all the workers. 
 
2. The lump of labour, and lump of something, fallacy 
The amount of work to be done is given and independent of the provisions of the labour law. 
This fallacy can refer to other objects of discourse, whenever they are taken as independent of 
the relevant legal provisions: the number and structure of firms, entrepreneurs, or whatever 
else. We may call the generalization of the lump of labour fallacy as the general lump of 
something fallacy. Turning to labour law, the provisions of the latter affect the number of jobs 
not only by varying existing firms' demand of labour (i.e. offers of employment), but also the 
set of existing firms (i. e. employers) and the supply of entrepreneurship (of those willing to 
start and to develop a firm and create jobs). To some extent the fallacy of the lump of 
something is based on a confusion between the short and the long run: jobs, firms, 
entrepreneurs are given at a certain moment of time, but are by no means given in the longer 
time frame in which legal provisions exert their effects.  
 
A popular instance of the lump of labour fallacy refers to the idea that if somebody retires, his 
job is available for somebody else, and thus unemployment can be reduced by lowering the 
retirement age.  
A popular instance of the lump of something fallacy is the idea that rent control does not 
affect the supply of dwellings for rent but only the distribution of income between landlords 
and tenants. 
 
3. The zero sum fallacy 
If somebody gets something more it means that somebody else gets less, if somebody's lot is 
improved, somebody else's must be worsened. Thus if employers gain, it means that workers 
lose, and vice-versa: a wage rise or a legal provision strengthening the bargaining power of 
trade unions, or enhancing jobs protection is considered to be always to the advantage of 
workers, even if it leads eventually to bankruptcy and closure of the firm, or to loss of 
competitiveness and slowing down of economic growth, higher long-term unemployment or 
high inflation.  
 
Here too the fallacy concerns the time frame: what looks favourable in the short run may be 
ruinous in the longer run. 
 
                                                 
23
  The first is expounded for instance in Samuelson’s Economics textbook, the third results from the 
notion itself of Pareto improvement. 
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